The Case for a Select Committee on Pardon Abuse
The corruption of the pardon power has been decades in the making. It’s time to fix it.
This is part three in our series on the abuse of the pardon power. You can read part one here and part two here. Checks & Balances is a newsletter of the Society for the Rule of Law Institute.
By Michael L. Stern
I know that no such thing exists, but hear me out as to why it should—and, admittedly more speculatively, why it could.
I assume there are few members of Congress who will deny privately that there has been a horrific abuse of the pardon power over the last decade. Publicly, however, most of them will acknowledge only the abuse that has occurred when the other party has controlled the White House. Still it would take only a handful of determined members on each side of the aisle to start a movement toward oversight of this ongoing assault on the rule of law.
On the merits, investigating pardon abuse should be a no brainer. It is true, as I wrote in a series of posts eight years ago (see here, here, here, and here), that the pardon power is broad and subject to no objective standards or external controls. Nonetheless, there are widely shared and ascertainable norms by which the use of the pardon power may be evaluated. Moreover, as the framers understood, a corrupt or truly egregious abuse of the pardon power is an impeachable offense.1
In 2018, I identified four categories of improper use or abuse of the pardon power that would warrant an impeachment inquiry: (1) corrupt or self-interested pardons; (2) pardons evidencing blatant favoritism; (3) pardons designed to obstruct the administration of justice or encourage future lawbreaking; and (4) pardons issued in a highly arbitrary or reckless manner. While there would probably be widespread agreement about these categories in the abstract, analyzing any particular pardon can be more challenging, especially when judgment becomes clouded by partisan passions. It is therefore helpful to consider more specific standards that have been developed over the years to guide the exercise of presidential clemency.
The 2002 Pardon Report
The most extensive congressional investigation of the use of the pardon power arose out of President Bill Clinton’s pardons at the very end of his presidency.2 The House Committee on Government Reform report identified a number of standards that can be used to guide and evaluate the exercise of the pardon power.3 These were derived in part from Justice Department regulations and the US Attorney’s Manual, which specify how clemency applications will be evaluated by the Pardon Attorney’s Office. The committee also made note of guidance contained in a 1996 memorandum from White House Counsel Jack Quinn to the deputy attorney general and the pardon attorney. While these documents do not bind the president, they provide guideposts to distinguish the traditional and regular use of the pardon power from that which is arbitrary, capricious or worse.
The standards identified by the committee include:
Seriousness of the offense. Not surprisingly, the guidelines favor clemency for minor crimes rather than major ones. The 1996 memorandum suggested that some crimes are so serious that pardons would not be considered “under almost any circumstances.” These included violent crimes like murder and rape, large-scale drug trafficking, and sex offenses involving minors. Also included in this category were “offenses involving central involvement in political corruption.”
Recency of the offense. The guidelines emphasize that a suitable length of time should have elapsed before a pardon is considered, particularly for more serious crimes. The regulations establish a floor of five years after the offender is released from prison or, if no jail time was involved, five years from conviction.
Effect on deterrence and the criminal justice system. The guidelines note that pardons, particularly for recent offenses, can be perceived as “denigrating the seriousness of the offense” and could “undermin[e] the deterrent effect of the conviction.” Further, “[i]n the case of a prominent individual or notorious crime, the likely effect of a pardon on law enforcement interests or upon the general public should be taken into account.”
Age of offender. The youth of an offender is a factor considered in favor of clemency.
Other criminal history. Indications that the criminal act was aberrational, and the offender has no other criminal record militate in favor of clemency.
Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation. The US Attorney’s Manual states that “[a]n individual’s demonstrated ability to lead a responsible and productive life for a significant period after conviction or release from confinement is strong evidence of rehabilitation and worthiness for pardon.”
Acceptance of responsibility, remorse and atonement. Acceptance of responsibility and restitution to victims are important considerations for clemency. The US Attorney’s Manual also observes that “a petitioner’s attempts to minimize or rationalize culpability does not advance the case for pardon.”
Other factors. Additional factors mentioned include whether the offender has a special need for relief (e.g., is prevented by legal disability from practicing a profession), disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age, or special service to the government such as cooperating with investigations or prosecutions.
These standards highlight the fact that clemency is (or should be) an individualized decision that focuses on the particular situation of the offender in question. The president does not have time to investigate the merits of clemency applications, and relying only on the information provided by applicants would not result in fair or balanced consideration. Accordingly, Congress funds the Office of Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice, which traditionally has been led by career officials. Its website claims that the office is “committed to timely and carefully reviewing all applications and making recommendations to the President that are consistent, unbiased, and uphold the interests of justice.” Congress has a clear oversight interest in ensuring that this representation to the public is truthful and accurate.
Part of the procedural regularity provided by the pardon attorney is to compile a complete record that is not limited to the views of those who are in support of the application. It is particularly important to ensure, as the US Attorney’s Manual explains, that “[t]he comments and recommendations of concerned and knowledgeable officials, particularly the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted the case and the sentencing judge, are carefully considered.” These are the officials best positioned to speak about how a pardon or commutation will affect deterrence and the interests of law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
The pardon process used by Clinton at the end of his presidency was harshly criticized by both Republicans and Democrats on the Government Reform committee. Democrats concluded that Clinton had invited a rush of last-minute pardon applications that overwhelmed the system and prevented him from getting accurate information or objective advice about clemency requests brought to him by various interested parties with access to the White House.4 As a result, Clinton made some highly questionable grants of clemency in the final hours of his presidency, most notoriously the pardons of wealthy fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green.5
Committee Republicans went further, suggesting that the one-sided nature of the Clinton pardon process was a feature, not a bug, designed to enable Clinton to grant clemency as favors to family members, political cronies, and wealthy donors. They pointed, for example, to evidence that Clinton allies deliberately sought to cut the Justice Department out of the decision-making process regarding the Rich/Green pardons.6 This resulted in pardon grants that at best were motivated by blatant favoritism and at worst actually corrupt.7
The Clinton pardons also illustrate the perils of granting clemency based on a one-sided process and/or without adequate deliberation. The committee found, for example, that the Rich and Green pardons violated numerous standards:
[Rich and Green] did not demonstrate responsible behavior after their indictment. Rather, by all accounts, they have remained fugitives from justice and continued to engage in business relations with the enemies of the United States. Their offenses were serious and notorious crimes for which, according to the Justice Department, a suitable length of time should pass between conviction and pardon. Yet Rich and Green never even stood trial. Rich and Green did not demonstrate any responsibility, remorse, or atonement for their crimes. Rather, they maintained that they were “singled out” and unfairly prosecuted. Rich and Green had no real need for relief. They lived in luxury and apparently sought pardons only so they could travel freely around the world, without fear of being apprehended by the US Marshal’s Service in countries that were cooperating with US efforts to apprehend them. Finally, there were no official recommendations or reports regarding the Rich and Green pardons, since the White House circumvented the normal pardon review process. If there had been such reports, however, it is safe to assume that the US Attorney’s office would have strongly objected to the Rich and Green pardons.8
In summary, although the president is under no legal obligation to follow either the substantive or procedural standards discussed above, those standards are useful to evaluate the president’s exercise of the pardon power. A dramatic departure from traditional norms and standards may suggest that a pardon was motivated by something other than the president’s sincere view of the merits. A pattern of questionable pardons given to friends or allies may suggest favoritism, corruption or some other improper motive. The granting of pardons without serious consideration of countervailing factors, such as their potential to undermine the administration of justice, may suggest recklessness and a breach of the duty to take care the laws be faithfully executed.9
The 2025 Staff Report
A more recent congressional investigation also evinces concerns about the pardon process, albeit from a perspective mostly focused on the mental acuity of former President Joe Biden. A majority staff report issued by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in October 2025 questions the legitimacy of pardons and commutations granted by Biden during his presidency.10
The report suggests clemency decisions, particularly regarding pardons and commutations granted on the last full day of the Biden administration, were made by aides rather than the president himself:
Testimony before the Committee confirmed that the pardons signed on January 19, 2025—which included pardons for members of President Biden’s family—were apparently the result of an in-person meeting in the final hours of his presidency, for which there is no contemporaneous documentation. Instead of actual documentation, the decision to grant these pardons was allegedly communicated to a [Chief of Staff Jeff] Zients aide, Rosa Po, who then called Zients, who verbally authorized the use of the autopen from home; Zients did not even know who actually used the autopen to apply the signature after his aide, using his email account with his permission, communicated that the autopen was authorized for the clemency actions. Zients did so without confirming with President Biden that he had, in fact, granted these pardons after repeatedly telling the American people he would not pardon his son, Hunter, let alone the five other members of the Biden family in the waning hours of his presidency.11
Although the report repeatedly highlights the use of the autopen, it is apparent that the real issue is the extent to which the president’s exercise of the pardon power comported with his constitutional responsibilities. The use of the autopen may be a poor or even constitutionally suspect practice, but many presidents other than Biden have employed it. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that the report’s conclusions would have changed if pardons were physically signed by a president who had no idea what he was signing. The report’s charge is that the Biden clemency decisions were illegitimate because Biden himself did not make them. The use of the autopen is evidence substantiating that charge, but it is not the charge itself.
Furthermore, the committee’s reasoning should logically extend to pardon abuses that do not involve mental incapacity. For example, suppose a mentally competent president outsources clemency decision-making entirely to an aide and simply signs whatever pardons and commutations the aide places on his desk. Such a process would not be constitutionally proper under the committee’s view that the president must personally make all clemency decisions. This does not necessarily mean the clemency grants themselves would be invalid, but the president would be accountable for violating his oath and failing to adhere to a proper constitutional process.
The same should be true if the president makes clemency decisions in a completely arbitrary manner (say by flipping a coin) or if he directs that all clemency applications will be granted if the applicant is a loyal member of his political party. All of these are examples of a president who has flagrantly violated his constitutional oath to faithfully execute his office. The autopen inquiry demonstrates that Congress can investigate to hold the president accountable for such violations.
It should also be noted that the committee report identifies troubling aspects of the Biden pardons apart from the autopen use. For example, it points to a DOJ ethics lawyer who objected to the White House’s description of Biden’s January 17, 2025 mass commutations as involving only non-violent offenses; the lawyer noted the commutations included many violent offenders as well as other “highly problematic” recipients. The lawyer’s email to the White House concluded: “Unfortunately and despite repeated requests and warnings, we were not afforded a reasonable opportunity to vet and provide input on those you were considering.” As the committee notes, this raises questions whether Biden was apprised of the information needed to make “informed decisions.”12
Not surprisingly, the report criticizes Biden for pardoning his son, Hunter, after repeatedly promising that he would not do so. It also reveals that Hunter participated in White House meetings about pardon decisions, including the pardons ultimately given to other Biden family members on January 19, 2025.13 Thus, the blatant favoritism of the pardons themselves was compounded by a process that itself lacked impartiality and likely had a chilling effect on anyone who wished to oppose these pardons.
One aspect of the Hunter Biden pardon not commented on by the committee relates to the “talking points” prepared for President Biden to defend the pardon. While the committee focuses on another part of this one-page document, it ignores the attempt to justify the pardon on the grounds that Hunter “was targeted by my political opponents to hurt me” and that “politics infected” the legal process.14 Such an attempt to deflect responsibility by attacking the fairness of the legal system was (rightly) criticized by the committee in the Rich and Green case, and it was even worse here because offered by the president himself. The committee’s decision to overlook this in Hunter Biden’s case perhaps reflects the desire to avoid an implicit criticism of another president who routinely disparages the fairness of the legal system when issuing pardons.
The key point here, however, is not whether one agrees with the committee’s criticisms of the Biden clemency process or thinks they were motivated by partisan considerations. What matters is the committee’s recognition that presidents can be held accountable for their clemency decisions and the process that produces them and that Congress (the House in particular) plays a central role in ensuring that accountability.
President Trump’s Pardons
I will only attempt to summarize briefly the extent to which President Trump’s abuse of the clemency power, particularly during his second term, has violated virtually every norm and standard discussed above. President Trump has issued a steady stream of pardons and commutations since taking office again on January 20, 2025. Apart from the approximately 1,500 individuals who received clemency in connection with the January 6 attack on the Capitol, about another 120 individuals have been granted pardons or commutations as of the date of this writing. Few of these seem to have involved the type of clemency application that would qualify for recommendation by the Office of the Pardon Attorney under the standards set forth above. It is doubtful that many went through the pardon attorney at all.
A good number of Trump’s pardons and commutations have gone to individuals convicted of corruption while serving in public office at the federal, state or local level. These are the types of crimes that would traditionally be considered ineligible for clemency under almost any circumstances. Yet Trump has granted clemency in many such cases, as described in a recent post on the Cato Institute blog. The relief was often implicitly or explicitly tied to political loyalty. For example, when he commuted the sentence of the notorious former congressman George Santos, one of only seven members expelled by the House of Representatives in its history, Trump wrote “Santos had the Courage, Conviction, and Intelligence to ALWAYS VOTE REPUBLICAN!” (As the Cato post points out, Biden also commuted the sentences of several corrupt officials).
Another theme is that wealthy individuals can purchase clemency, or at least a clemency lottery ticket, by paying lobbyists and others with access to the Trump White House. A recent New York Times article describes how Joseph Schwartz, a wealthy owner of a nursing home empire who was accused of committing numerous regulatory and financial offenses that endangered the residents and defrauded the employees, obtained a pardon after serving only three months of a three-year sentence for tax crimes. He would seem to have been a poor candidate for clemency, given that he had committed serious crimes for which he had just been convicted. Nor is there any evidence of remorse or acceptance of responsibility; instead, supporters like Laura Loomer claimed that Schwartz was the victim of “obvious antisemitism” by the judge. Nonetheless, Schwartz was able to gain clemency from President Trump after paying more than a million dollars to lobbyists and others with access to the White House and powerful influencers like Loomer.
Schwartz is far from the only convicted felon to have used wealth and connections to obtain clemency from the Trump White House. The epic scandal of the Rich and Green pardons has now become institutionalized into what the Times article calls “the lucrative pardon industry that has emerged around Mr. Trump.” In 2025 lobbying firms disclosed almost $5.2 million in payments for clemency-related lobbying activities; given that there are many ways to avoid disclosing such payments, the actual expenditures by pardon seekers is undoubtedly much higher.
Another group of clemency recipients consist of those who have made large financial contributions to the Trump political campaigns or organizations. These include Nicola founder Trevor Milton (who donated nearly $2 million toward Trump’s 2024 election), venture capitalist Imaad Zuberi (who had previously donated more than $800,000 to political committee associated with Trump and the Republican Party), Paul Walczak, a Florida businessman whose pardon application stated that his mother had donated and raised millions for Trump’s presidential campaigns, and, most recently, Wanda Vazquez Garced, a former Puerto Rican governor who was pardoned after a relative made a $2.5 million donation to a Trump-aligned political action committee.
Other pardons raise even greater concerns. For example, there is the pardon of Changpeng Zhao, the founder of Binance, a global cryptocurrency exchange. Zhao and Binance were charged with willful violations of US money laundering and sanctions laws, which facilitated transactions involving terrorist organizations, cybercriminals, child sex abuse, and sanctioned individuals in jurisdictions such as Iran and North Korea. Binance allegedly had extensive business dealings with World Liberty Financial, a crypto currency company largely owned by Trump and his family, and otherwise provided substantial benefits to the Trump family. A group of Democratic lawmakers have raised concerns about the pardon, the financial conflicts of interest, and potential relaxation of compliance requirements imposed on Binance that pose “serious national-security and financial-crime risks.”
There is also the pardon of Juan Orlando Hernández, former president of Honduras, who had served only 17 months of a 45-year sentence when Trump pardoned him. In June 2024, Hernandez was convicted by a federal jury of conspiring to import cocaine into the United States and related firearms offenses. The Justice Department alleged that he and his co-conspirators were responsible for trafficking more than 400 tons of US-bound cocaine through Honduras over an 18-year period. Needless to say, this would seem to be the type of serious crime that would not be eligible for a pardon at all, much less early on in a lengthy prison sentence. Even some Republicans have questioned why Trump would give a pardon under such circumstances, particularly when it directly contradicts his policies toward drug trafficking in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America. Trump has offered little in the way of explanation other than claiming that Hernandez was treated “unfairly.” Resolutions to condemn this pardon have been introduced in both the House and the Senate.
Finally, the most alarming pardons of all are those that fall in the third category I initially listed, namely pardons designed to obstruct the administration of justice or encourage future lawbreaking. Professor Lee Kovarsky has termed these “patronage pardons,” referring to pardons that the president can grant to or dangle before subordinates and other loyalists in order to induce them to commit crimes on his behalf. Trump’s early first-term pardons, such as that given to Sheriff Joe Arpaio for criminal contempt of a federal court order against racial profiling, were widely seen as a signal that he would be willing to pardon political allies who remained loyal to him. This impression was confirmed when both Paul Manafort, Trump’s 2016 campaign manager, and Michael Flynn, his first national security advisor, were pardoned at the end of Trump’s first term after they were convicted of federal crimes but did not implicate Trump.15 Trump’s mass pardons of January 6 rioters at the start of his second term not only rewarded his loyal supporters and demonstrated his approval of their lawbreaking on his behalf, but it communicated how he would treat future lawbreaking:
The message was loud and clear. If President Trump is willing to protect January 6 attackers—he has pardoned crimes only tangentially related to the insurrection—then he is willing to protect other allies. . . . The pardons tell supporters that they can ignore law to support the patron, because the patron will disable criminal punishment. In a way, then, patronage pardons affix deputy badges to the lapels of loyalist vigilantes everywhere.16
This effect is even more pernicious with regard to subordinate government officials, particularly political appointees. These officials are already inclined and incentivized (being removable at will) to do the president’s bidding; patronage pardons remove or greatly reduce the countervailing pressure to obey the law. As Professor Kovarsky notes, they also make it much more difficult for independent investigators or courts to respond to violations because these loyalist officials do not have to fear legal consequences for perjury, obstruction, or criminal contempt.17 Worst of all, officials who have already committed crimes (or potential crimes) are incentivized to commit more because they are already beholden to the president for protection.18 In short, the power to issue patronage pardons “represents a staggering threat to the rule of law and democratic accountability.”19
Can Congress Investigate?
What has been said so far has hopefully been sufficient to convince you that an investigation of pardon abuse is warranted. This leaves the question of whether Congress has the ability to conduct such an investigation. It will not surprise you to learn that the executive branch has taken a dim view of congressional oversight of the exercise of the pardon authority. As Attorney General Janet Reno advised President Clinton in 1999 (regarding a congressional investigation of an earlier group of pardons), “it appears that Congress’ oversight authority does not extend to the process employed in connection with a particular clemency decision, to the materials generated or the discussions that took place as part of that process, or to the advice or views the President received in connection with a clemency decision.”20
Nonetheless, for the reasons stated below, there is no insuperable legal or practical barrier to a congressional investigation of pardon abuse. To begin with, the House clearly has the power to investigate pardons for purposes of impeachment. Reno’s claims regarding limitations on Congress’s “oversight” authority, even if accurate, are irrelevant to such an investigation. (To obviate any objection to the investigating committee’s authority to conduct an impeachment inquiry, the House should expressly delegate this authority to either a select or standing committee).
No doubt there are political reasons why the House might be reluctant to begin another impeachment inquiry, particularly if it is proceeding on a bipartisan basis. But I would argue that the House’s impeachment authority extends not only to determining whether there is a current basis for articles of impeachment, but also to developing standards for future impeachment inquiries. Here we have overwhelming evidence of systemic abuse of the pardon power, some of which goes beyond a single administration or president. The House should therefore be able to gather information needed to establish standards to guide future exercises of the impeachment power. Such guidelines might, for example, provide that a president who pardons himself or a family member will automatically trigger an impeachment inquiry.
Furthermore, contra Reno, Congress does have legitimate oversight interests with regard to pardon abuse. For one thing, it funds the Office of the Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice for purposes of ensuring that the president receives complete, professional and impartial advice. There is, to put it mildly, reason to believe that these funds are not being used for their intended purpose. To cite one example, the Trump administration dismissed the career official who served as pardon attorney and replaced her with Ed Martin, a Trump loyalist who does not even make a pretense of impartiality.21
Apart from its undoubted power over funding, Congress may have other legislative authorities here. The Pardon Transparency and Accountability Act of 2025 (S. 256), for example, would increase the transparency of the pardon process by increasing disclosure of lobbying efforts to obtain clemency, and requiring the pardon attorney to make periodic reports to Congress. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such provisions might be constitutionally challenged, it cannot be said that they are so clearly unconstitutional so as to deny Congress’s right to obtain information relevant to their potential adoption.
Furthermore, many of the pardons in question affect other areas of congressional concern. For example, as the Congressional Research Service notes here, the Hernandez pardon has significant ramifications for US national security and its relations with Honduras. Similarly, the Zhao pardon has raised concerns about how it will affect the regulation of crypto-currency.
Congressional oversight also has an important function in ensuring accountability to the public. While executive branch lawyers may not understand this, members of Congress should. As Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton remarked during the Clinton pardon investigation:
The investigation was not only warranted; I believe the investigation has already served an important purpose. It is impossible for me to believe that any person contemplating running for President of the United States or who gets that office will again participate in the kind of pardon activity that went on at the end of the Clinton Administration.22
While Norton’s remarks did not turn out to be prescient, that may be in part because Congress has largely abdicated its responsibility to conduct oversight of pardon abuse.
Finally, Congress has one other constitutional function which clearly entitles it to investigate pardon abuse. Under Article V, Congress by a vote of two-thirds of each house may propose amendments to the Constitution. It may be that truly reforming the pardon power may require such an amendment, and in fact various amendments to limit the pardon power have been floated and in at least one case (H.J. Res. 13) introduced in the current Congress. While there is little legal precedent on Congress’s authority to gather information for use in its amendment-proposing function, I see no persuasive argument against the existence of such authority.
The strength of these legal arguments, of course, are unlikely to persuade the executive branch to cooperate with an investigation of pardon abuse. We can anticipate that the Trump administration will refuse to produce internal documents or government officials to testify before an investigating committee. It will likely not produce information regarding private persons who interceded on behalf of clemency recipients, even though the executive branch has not traditionally considered that to be privileged information. Indeed, in a classic defense of the emerging doctrine of executive privilege, Attorney General William P. Rogers stressed that the Eisenhower administration was committed to making certain information about the pardon process available to the public: “[W]e have now the practice of making all pardons and commutations of sentences a matter of public record. Thus in the event a question arises as to the propriety of a pardon, any interested person may examine the record, which now includes the names of all persons who interceded on behalf of or expressed interest in the convicted person.”23
Even without the cooperation of the executive branch (and setting aside the possibility of employing compulsory process against it), however, Congress can gather a great deal of information regarding pardon abuse. Much information is publicly available, and a good deal has already been reported by investigative journalists. The pardon recipients and the lobbyists they have employed are subject to congressional subpoena. Former pardon attorneys and others can provide information regarding the clemency process and how it has broken down over recent administrations. Many victims of the pardoned crimes, including those who have been intentionally or recklessly deprived of restitution by the pardons, will be eager to testify. The same goes for prosecutors who labored for years to bring criminals to justice and then found their work negated because the president decided it was “unfair.” All of these sources of information and more would be available to an energetic investigating committee.
All that is required is a little courage and a few good men and women who care more about the rule of law than political expediency.
Michael L. Stern is an attorney and commentator specializing in legal issues affecting Congress and the legislative process. He served as senior counsel to the US House of Representatives from 1996 to 2004, where he advised and represented the House leadership, committees, members, officers, and staff on a wide range of legal matters, including investigations, ethics, election contests, campaign finance, and the implementation of the Lobbying Disclosure and Congressional Accountability Acts. He also served as deputy staff director for investigations for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and as special counsel to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He teaches congressional oversight as an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management.
1See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“The remedy for Presidential abuses of the power to pardon . . . [is] ultimately impeachment in cases of extreme abuse.”).
2See Justice Undone: Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House, H.R. Rep. 107-454 (2002) (vol. I-III).
3Id. at 28-32.
4See H.R. Rep. 107-454, vol. III, at 3294-95 (minority views) (“Under these circumstances, and working against the clock, the White House and Justice Department officials responsible for assisting the President could not and did not conduct appropriate review of every petition.”).
5See id. at 3295 (minority views) (“The Marc Rich pardon was . . . the product of a rushed and one-sided process, and it reflected deeply flawed judgment by the President.”).
6See H.R. Rep. 107-454, vol. I, at 6.
7See id. at 27 (noting that the pardons of Rich and Green “raised substantial questions of direct corruption,” while other cases “involved indirect corruption, where close relatives of the President—namely Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham— apparently traded on their relationships with the President to lobby for pardons and commutations”).
8Id. at 32; see also id. at 28-29 (“In his rush to grand pardons and commutations in the waning hours of his presidency, Bill Clinton ignored almost every applicable standard governing the exercise of the clemency power.”).
9Cf. id. at 35-37 (criticizing Clinton’s pardons as establishing “two standards of justice” and undermining “efforts of law enforcement officers everywhere”).
10See The Biden Autopen Presidency: Decline, Delusion, and Deception in the White House (Oct. 28, 2025).
11Id. at iv-v (emphasis in original).
12Id. at 82.
13Id. at 85.
14See id. at 87.
15See Lee Kovarsky, Patronage Pardons, U. of Texas Law Legal Studies Research Paper at 20-21 (last rev. Feb. 4, 2026).
16Kovarsky, Patronage Pardons at 25.
17See Kovarsky, Patronage Pardons at 29-33.
18Id. at 37-38.
19Kovarsky, Patronage Pardons at 33.
20Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decision, 23 O.L.C. 1, 3-4 (Sept. 16, 1999).
21See Kovarsky, Patronage Pardons, at 3 & n.13, 26 (noting that “it was Martin who captured the spirit of Trump-era patronage pardoning with the slogan “No MAGA Left Behind’”).
22H.R. 107-494, vol. III, at 3391 (quoted in the Additional Views of Hon. Dan Burton).
23Statement of the Honorable William P. Rogers, Attorney General of the United States, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee 5 (Mar. 6, 1958).